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1. Space
In 1934, a very young Giulio Carlo Argan wrote, for a rather provincial 
magazine, a fundamental text titled “Il problema del Bramante”, or 
“Bramante’s Problem”.1 Argan tried to identify the focus of Bramante’s 
interests and to define his particular way of making architecture. He 
concluded that what was systematically explored in Bramante’s work 
was space: for Argan, Bramante’s architecture was a spectacle of spa- 
tiality,2 an investigation of space developed beyond tectonic constraints 
and a rhetoric of space understood as the endlessly multiplied unfold-
ing of artificial landscapes.
But if the substance of this architecture is space, then what kind of 
sense did Bramante attribute to his work on space? And, more generally, 
what does it mean to work on space? What kind of intellectual value 
does such work have? What kind of "problem" is Bramante’s problem?
Bramante’s problem is space: the possibility of making space and 
the possibilities then built into that space. His investigation takes 
the form of a phenomenology: whether it is possible to think space, 
whether it is possible to move in space, whether it is at all possible to 
live in space and, finally, whether it is possible to control space, whether 
the contradictory desires that produce space can survive in space and 
whether such a production of space could prove somehow realizable.
Here it becomes necessary to introduce a provisional definition 
of space.3 Space has a double nature: indeed, space can be occupied 
or not, filled with matter or empty. Space filled with matter (i.e., a vol-
ume or, in phenomenological terms, an obstacle) can be measured by 
means of a system of coordinated architectural elements, or order. 
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Unoccupied space is void, and within that void actions and gestures 
can take place. Architecture can consequently be defined as the pro-
duction of the void by means of order (by positioning and decorating 
obstacles to human movement).4
Bramante understood architecture as the construction of the void by 
means of order: in the terms of an absurdist metaphysics, the produc-
tion of the form of non-being by means of the production of the form of 
being (a definition in which the relationship between being and non-
being is entirely instrumental, as if, in architecture, being would be 
non-being’s little helper).
Without a doubt, the idea of a form of the void is paradoxical, given 
that the void should be, by definition, indeterminate, and so lack-
ing form. And yet in architecture – and most notably in Bramante’s 
architecture – the void has a form, and so architecture, in its material 
evidence, forces us to imagine a different definition of “void”,5 one that 
allows it to receive a form and yet at the same time still contain infi-
nite possibilities. Such a definition allows architecture to be thought 
of as a relationship between order and void, as a relationship between 
something real and something possible, between something finite and 
something infinite. As a consequence, the void becomes the receptacle 
of the possible, the repository of all gestures that could end up occupy-
ing its emptiness (the depository of all leaving and of all glances and of 
all farewells, the warehouse of all fighting and of all insults and of all 
brawls, the storeroom of all lying and of all kisses and of all betrayals). 
Such a definition allows architecture to be conceived as a discipline 
in which the increase in the precision of the order coincides with the 
expansion of the set of gestures possible within it.
Bramante’s problem is space, and space is a logical and political problem. 
Architecture is a double search: a direct (logical) search for order 
with indirect (political) consequences for the void. Work on order is a 
search for consistency among the given data of the architectural prob-
lem: logical work on the possibility to insert all given elements into a 
coherent whole. Work on the void is an investigation of the possibility of 
gestures: political work on the conditions that are artificially established 
by means of borders and limits. Architecture is a series of experiments 
with order and void, and with the peculiarity that while working on 
order is directly possible, working on the void can only operate indi-
rectly, namely by working on order. And of course the direct work on 
general – and I sincerely 
doubt such an endeavour 
would be of much use to 
architecture. 
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hypothesis.
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order is subordinated to the indirect work on the void. Architecture is 
just a logical operation that measures a scene enclosing a determined 
amount of void and, consequently, an infinite series of possible gestures. 
The only talent required for such an activity is precision.
“Il n’y a point d’autre vertu que l’amour de l’ordre.”6
2. Logical Work
Bramante’s work can be read as a treatise – as all his contemporaries read 
it – because each architectural problem he tackled was both precisely 
solved in its real terms and understood as an episode of a larger theory 
on architecture. This concrete theory7 was developed through design 
essays elaborated for each of a series of different commissions: an essay 
on the orders at the cloister of Santa Maria della Pace and the Belvedere 
staircase; an essay on scale at San Pietro in Montorio and St Peter’s; an 
essay on type and city-making at the Palazzo Caprini and the Palazzo 
dei Tribunali; an essay on dome and nave at the cathedral in Pavia and 
St Peter’s . . . These site-specific and multi-layered essays did not apply 
a pre-established doctrine or derive consequences from a lone original 
foundation, but rather contributed to the construction of a general 
theory starting from the given circumstances of each particular case.8
Bramante was a realist. He had no interest in utopias. No “ideal” pro-
ject by Bramante is known: even the Prevedari engraving (an explicitly 
theoretical exercise describing an imaginary building taken as a pretext 
for exposing a working method) shows a relatively small construction 
that is thoroughly feasible and avoids addressing the city or the future 
or society at large. His designs – even the most megalomaniacal ones, 
even the ones that appear to be nothing but colossal nasty jokes – were 
always for real. For instance, Bramante’s proposal to re-position St 
Peter’s basilica in order to align it with the Vatican obelisk9 was both 
a disconcerting act of cynicism (asking the pope to move the tomb of 
the apostle!) and a very pragmatic way of hiding the fact that he could 
not move the obelisk. Bramante proposed solving from an ideological 
point of view what he could not solve from a technological one: given 
that he was not able to move the obelisk, he could still imagine moving 
the church . . . It is on the basis of this extreme realism that Bramante’s 
logical work becomes intelligible and reveals its peculiar interest. The 
formal purity is built upon the concrete materiality of the given archi-
tectural problem, whose exceptional circumstances are not negated or 
eliminated, but on the contrary used to produce the final result. This 
6.  
Nicolas Malebranche, 
Traité de morale (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1999). 
 
7.  
The built theory that can 
be decoded from his 
buildings is so clear and 
so consequent that any 
discussion of the possible 
existence of a treatise 
by Bramante becomes 
redundant (a treatise by 
Bramante is mentioned 
by Lomazzo in his Trattato 
dell’arte della pittura, 
scoltura et architettura 
of 1584). Bramante’s 
theoretical work was so 
obvious to contemporary 
architects that Vasari felt 
the need to underline the 
pragmatic component of his 
work right at the beginning 
of his biography: “non 
solamente teorico ma . . . ” 
(not simply a theoretician 
but . . . ); see Giorgio 
Vasari, “Vita di Bramante 
da Urbino”, in idem, Le vite 
de’ piú eccellenti architetti, 
pittori, et scultori italiani, 
da Cimabue insino a’ tempi 
nostri (Milan: Newton 
Compton, 1997), 332. 
 
8.  
“Each work by Bramante . . . ,  
more than the 
demonstration of an 
architectural theorem, 
appears as the rigorous and 
detached exposition of the 
data of an equation with 
several unknowns whose 
solution is not given a priori, 
but, on the contrary, can 
reveal the unsuitableness 
of the given data through its 
own elaboration.” Manfredo 
Tafuri, L’architettura 
dell’umanesimo (Bari: 
Laterza, 1969), 128; 
translated by the author.
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form of realism meant that the very randomness of Bramante’s com-
missions led to deeper evolutions in his investigations.
Like that of all of his contemporaries, Bramante’s work meant combin-
ing given architectural pieces with given opportunities.10 The problems 
were given and the tools to solve the problems were also given. What was 
special about and defined the tone of Bramante’s work was his attempt 
to adapt architectural elements to specific opportunities without com-
promising the possibility of using these very same elements in other pos-
sible opportunities – in other words, using the specific case as a chance 
to re-define and expand the domain of the rule that was put to test in 
that specific case. For each new case he had to derive a new solution 
from a predetermined, finite repertoire, so he had to propose a new 
definition of that repertoire each time (one that was capable of compris-
ing all previous cases as well as the new one, one that was once again 
finite and yet ampler than the previous). Bramante systematically tried 
to show that a more refined and at the same time more general idea of 
order existed, one that did not exclude an adequate solution for all the 
particular circumstances with which architecture would be faced in the 
future. Through this logical work, the given architectural problem was 
systematically suspended and re-formulated. By addressing different 
and completely random opportunities, Bramante’s works shifted from 
one order to another in a process that appeared to be the deepening (and 
therefore the expansion) of all preceding efforts. Innovation happened 
as a reaction to the opportunities that presented themselves, and so it 
was a clarification in the use of a repertoire that could be transformed 
and expanded but was never re-founded from scratch. In this respect, 
working with given architectural elements meant concentrating on the 
availability of all existing forms to all human activities. What was at stake 
was not the invention of new forms, but the confirmation that all exist-
ing forms were part of a shared code and, consequently, of a shared life. 
2.1 Order
It has been common to refer to the impact of Bramante’s work on 
Renaissance architecture as the establishment of a new “universal lan-
guage”.11 This terminology, however, is suspect. The work of Bramante 
is certainly “universal”, and yet Bramante did not think of architecture 
as “language”. Even when Bramante’s buildings most blatantly served 
as propaganda, their message was nothing but their own grammar, 
the triumphal announcement of the conquest of the grammar of 
9.  
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Inglese (Rome: Bulzoni, 1981), 
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(Roma: De Luca, 1974), 351–
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classical antiquity. The Doric order of San Pietro in Montorio has been 
explained as a reference to the maleness of the martyr (understood as 
a soldier of Christ) following Vitruvius’s characterization of the Doric.12 
Yet Bramante used the Doric simply because it was the most classical 
and most difficult13 order – he did it just to show his complete com-
mand of the Roman repertoire. (San Pietro in Montorio is bravado, or 
maybe even insolence, not symbolism!) With San Pietro in Montorio, 
as in any other project, Bramante did not want to say anything except 
that he was capable of saying everything. And even if “language”, with 
respect to Bramante, is understood only in metaphorical terms – in 
order to suggest the establishment of a grammar, of a system of for-
malized relations – “language” still cannot help but imply some sort 
of intentional signification. On the contrary, the study of Bramante 
requires a terminology that while it does not exclude the possibility 
of attributing meaning to architecture, it does consider meanings as 
accidental and maintains that architecture is not a medium, but in 
terms that are indirect and all in all unpredictable for the architect. 
Bramante indeed saw meanings as a possible field of compromise 
with all other subjects involved in making architecture. Meanings 
were entirely negotiable. Bramante was fine with any meaning that 
did not get in the way of his work on order and void.
The new terminology for the study of Bramante could actually be 
an old one. Indeed, the system of architectural elements derived from 
the Roman tradition that Bramante employed in his work and that was 
later used by his followers can be simply called “order”, as Bramante 
and his contemporaries themselves called it.14 In fact, Renaissance 
architects spoke of “order” and “orders” (ordine and ordini), but never 
of “language” (lingua). And although “order” is just one of the many 
terms employed by Renaissance architects to refer to the systems of 
architectural elements derived from their analysis of Roman ruins,15 
the use of the term “order” at least leaves the discussion in its origi-
nal terms, without introducing any signifier/signified relation for the 
use of the classical architectural elements. “Order” suggests a logical 
operation, one that orders a set of conventionally defined architectural 
elements. “Order” is both a strictly formalized notion and a plural one. 
In this respect, the Renaissance terminology might be less naïve than 
we might think: in Renaissance literature, “order” (ordine) is never 
separated from a plurality of “orders” (ordini). “Order” is used both 
for a set of architectural elements from the classical tradition (one of 
the so-called five orders – for instance, the Ionic) and for the “order” of 
12. 
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I, 2, 5. 
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Donato Bramante, “Bramanti 
opinio super domicilium 
seu templum magnum”, 
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about fortifications (and the 
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a certain building, meaning the particular relationships between the 
various “orders” employed in that building (e.g., the specific combina-
tion of Doric, Composite and Corinthian of the Palazzo Rucellai), but 
also for the totality of the “orders”, for the “order of the orders”. This 
use might seem confused, but it is not all that different from the use of 
concepts in logic such as “set” or “class”, and architectural “ordering” 
generates exactly the same logical complications of any other recur-
sive procedure. This plurality and recursivity of the notion of order re- 
appears throughout the architecture of Bramante. The Chiostro della 
Pace and the Belvedere staircase are explicitly designed as an “order 
of all orders”. Both of these designs were understood as a combina-
tion of all of the possible orders – in one case, squeezed into a square 
courtyard, and in the other, into a spiral staircase. This search for an 
“order of all orders” had nothing absolute to it; on the contrary, both 
the Chiostro della Pace and the Belvedere staircase were extremely 
site-specific projects that by no means tried to hide the idiosyncratic 
circumstances in which they happened to be developed. The universal 
ambition of these projects was once again built by starting from the 
particular. The search for an “order of orders”, or even of an “order of 
all orders”, remained a purely logical investigation, and anyhow, it was 
not an attempt to find an origin of or a foundation for order. Bramante 
did not search for such a foundation, nor for a referent for order. He 
was fine with order being without any foundations and without any 
significations. 
2.2 A Certain Idea of Roman Architecture
The recovery of the architecture of the ancient Romans was a goal for all 
of the architects of the Italian Renaissance. Bramante was no exception, 
but he did not follow the Roman fashion with the sincere enthusiasm 
of Mantegna or Alberti (or, for that matter, of Raphael or Palladio); he 
merely took it as a fashion and proceeded to gain complete control over 
a heritage that others simply contemplated with nostalgia.
Bramante’s interpretation of Roman ruins was a pragmatic reac-
tion to the impasse experienced by the other architects of the time, 
all of whom were incapable of putting together the different ambi-
tions they had inherited from the architectural debate of the 15th 
century. Giuliano da Sangallo, for instance, spent his entire life trying 
to reconcile nature (tectonics), theory (Vitruvius) and architectural 
evidence (ruins as found). Of course he never managed, and Giuliano’s 
architecture never succeeded in ridding itself of its overly complicated 
the fortress). So the term 
“order” is relatively well 
represented in what remains 
of Bramante’s “theoretical 
production”. According 
to Christof Thoenes, 
the first use of “ordine” 
in the contemporary 
understanding is in the 
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terminology; see Christof 
Thoenes,“‘Spezie’ e ‘ordine’ 
di colonne nell’architettura
di Brunelleschi”, in Filippo 
Brunelleschi: La sua opera e il 
suo tempo, vol. II (Florence: 
Centro Di, 1980). Thoenes 
also discusses the evolution 
of the terminology of the 
“five orders” in his “Vignolas 
Regola delli cinque ordini”, 
Römisches Jahrbuch für 
Kunstgeschichte 20 (1983), 
345–76. 
 
15.  
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“generazione” (generation), 
“qualità” (quality), “maniera” 
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hypothesis. Bramante approached the problem differently. For him, only 
ruins (i.e., physical evidence or reality) mattered; the rest was supersti-
tion. Like Machiavelli, who analyzed Roman political history without 
much concern for Roman political theory – he gave hyper-detailed 
commentary of Livy and largely ignored Cicero – Bramante investigated 
the evidence of Roman architecture believing that its theory could be 
written anew. He looked at the architecture of the Romans the same 
way in which Quentin Tarantino looks at Italian B-movies of the 1970s 
or Sergio Leone looked at classic Westerns or Ludovico Ariosto looked 
at the chanson de geste.16 In all of these cases, what matters is simply the 
repertoire of figures that can be employed to explore potential relation-
ships, no matter whether this repertoire is a heap of broken columns, 
a bunch of ignorant cowboys or a gang of even more ignorant knights.
For Bramante, who lived in Rome at the beginning of the 16th 
century, Roman architecture provided the largest and most accessible 
sample that could be directly analyzed and used to clarify architec-
tural relationships. Nothing more. The Italian landscape was full of 
Roman debris: everybody could see, measure and learn from them. For 
Bramante, the abundance of the ruins at hand provided the opportunity 
for developing a rigorously derivative understanding of architecture. 
So Bramante’s architecture was derived from Roman ruins, yet for 
him the crucial point was logical – that architecture was derived – and 
not sentimental – that it was derived from the Romans. The derivative 
nature of architecture corresponded to an understanding of the ruins 
as part of the public domain (Romans were indeed kind enough not to 
copyright their ruins, a fact that allowed the entire history of Western 
architecture to unfold). As a consequence, Bramante’s approach to 
Roman architecture was very different from that of his contemporar-
ies. Roman architecture, for Bramante, was simply the pretext for a 
universalist agenda, and in fact, Bramante still referred to a plurality 
of sources (Roman and non-Roman) in the assembling of his spaces. 
Bramante understood the recovery of the architectural repertoire of 
the Romans as a logical operation, one that expanded the resources 
of contemporary architecture and exposed the possibility of finding 
a solution for every possible architectural problem. By conquering – 
and in a very brief interval of time – all of Rome’s architectural herit-
age and showing its immediate availability, Bramante freed Roman 
ruins from all enchantment, from all nostalgia, from all messages. 
Bramante’s conquest had something destructive to it that would not 
have particularly pleased truly sincere classicists like Mantegna and 
“lavoro” (work), “ragione” 
(reason), “modo” (manner), 
“misura” (measure), “forma” 
(form), “sorta” (kind); see 
Thoenes,“‘Spezie’ e ‘ordine’”. 
 
16.  
Leone explicitly referred 
to Ariosto’s work in exactly 
these terms; see Piero Spila 
and Bruno Torri, “Intervista 
a Carlo Lizzani”, CineCritica, 
nos. 54–55 (Apr.–Sept. 2009).
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Alberti. If Bramante inherited anything from the Romans, it was the 
universalism that could be deduced from an architecture that had to 
take into account the needs of a global empire. And although Bramante 
never happened to see the more explicitly multicultural Roman archi-
tecture of the Near East and North Africa (he would certainly have 
liked Leptis and Jerash), he perceived the universalism of Rome in 
the metropolitan nature of its ruins. Like St Paul, Bramante needed 
Rome as metropolis to construct his universal project. 
2.2.1 Universalism
Bramante never considered the problem of how Roman architecture 
could be understood and employed as universal architecture in “com-
parative” terms. This formulation of the problem lay outside of his 
cultural context.17 Bramante was familiar with a fairly limited number 
of architectural repertoires: during his life, he came in contact with 
Roman, Romanesque, Byzantine and Gothic architecture, and it is 
possible to argue that he might have had some notion about Greek, 
Arabic and Ottoman architecture. Anyhow, what defines the univer-
salist tone of his classicism is not the plurality of the sources he was 
confronted with. On the contrary, Bramante discovered the openness 
of the classical code within this code, observing it from a logical point 
of view, not from an anthropological one.
The only difference between repertoires to which Bramante was 
personally exposed in his life is the one that distinguished Milan and 
Rome at the end of the 15th century.18 In Rome, after experiencing a 
change of context, Bramante could derive all of the conclusions that a 
confrontation of different repertoires made necessary. In other words, 
with respect to a new context and a (slightly) new repertoire, the nature 
of the operation he carried out upon these repertoires became clearer. 
The difference between Bramante’s Milanese and Roman periods is 
not a difference in the toolbox employed, but a difference in his con-
sciousness of the logical and derivative nature of architectural praxis. 
And if a rationalist universalism was already a feature of Bramante’s 
work in Milan (the Opinio on the Milanese cathedral leaves no doubt 
about this19), then in Rome all the consequences of this approach 
became clear. The incredible openness of Bramante’s architecture – 
which is even more surprising once the extremely limited diversity 
upon which it was based is taken into account – was built through a 
purely logical investigation, a merciless analysis of Roman architecture 
which, within this very same Roman repertoire, revealed no reason to 
17.  
Bramante lived in the age of 
discovery and at the dawn of 
colonialism. His life (1444– 
1514) more or less coincided 
with those of Christopher 
Columbus (1451–1506) and 
Amerigo Vespucci (1454–
1512). Although Bramante 
never left Italy, and although 
an explicit anthropological 
interest developed only 
later (Montaigne’s essay on 
cannibals dates to 1580), the 
universalism of Bramante’s 
work is undeniable and it 
must be seen in relation to 
contemporary geopolitical 
transformations. 
 
18.  
For an introduction to the 
Milanese context, see Luigi 
Patetta, L’architettura 
del Quattrocento a Milano 
(Milan: Maggioli, 2011). On 
the Roman context, see 
Piero Tomei, L’architettura 
a Roma nel Quattrocento 
(Rome: Multigrafica, 1942); 
Christoph L. Frommel, Der 
römische Palastbau der 
Hochrenaissance (Tübingen: 
Verlag Ernst Wasmuth, 1973); 
and Paul Letarouilly, Les 
édifices de Rome moderne 
(Princeton: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 1997 
reprint). 
 
19.  
Donato Bramante, “Bramanti 
opinio super domicilium seu 
templum magnum”, in Studi 
Bramanteschi, 22–24.
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limit the number of possible architectural solutions to be employed 
in contemporary practice.
The move from Milan to Rome was for Bramante a direct experi-
ence of a move from one “order” to another. This compulsory change 
of paradigm, which the architect experienced in his own life, had a 
retroactive effect on his entire understanding of order. Order remained 
a closed system – given that its components can have meaning only in 
relation to one another and within the context of an overall structure – 
and yet it was evident to Bramante that reality also included shifts 
between orders: it was possible to re-think (and re-new) order by jump-
ing from one order to another.
By using Roman architecture in the same abstract and pragmatic way 
as somebody who repairs a tractor using pieces from an old Ferrari, 
Bramante defined an idea of classicism that rejected any definition of 
identity – a project based on a shared past – and imagined a universal 
agenda – a project based on a shared future. By doing so, he erased any 
possibility of understanding the classical repertoire as a tradition and 
turned the Roman repertoire into the operative toolbox of a project 
proceeding from the particular towards the universal. This approach 
also meant that he understood the Roman architectural heritage not 
as a totality but as a collection of pieces (or precedents). These pieces 
composed a group of elements with no intrinsic value beyond the fact 
that they could be ordered in a consistent set. For instance, the fact 
that Bramante imagined St Peter’s as the sum of the Pantheon and the 
Basilica of Maxentius meant that both addends in this sum were under-
stood as parts. In the new St Peter’s, the Pantheon was reduced to dome 
and the Basilica was reduced to nave, and the architectural problem of 
the new building was reduced to the definition of the element that could 
make possible the coexistence of dome and nave – namely the piers of 
the new church (the only problem that Bramante investigated over and 
over in his drawings for St Peter’s – drawings in which both nave and 
dome are fundamentally neglected). Entire buildings became parts of a 
composition that had an essayistic tone and escaped any idea of totality 
that was not the – ultimately unachievable – totality of thoroughly uni-
versal architecture. Like any kind of universalism, Bramante’s implied 
a negative, sceptical side that was committed to showing that all partial 
realities were false with respect to the only truly universal one. As such, 
the architecture of Bramante was not only derived from the Romans, 
but also explicitly anti-Roman – or at least clearly opposed to fanatics 
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who pretended that the totality of architecture coincided with Roman 
architecture. Bramante’s indifferent approach to antiquity (and his 
notion of parts and totality, and of their relationship) could be subjected 
to the critique that Pietro Bembo addressed to Giovan Francesco Pico:
What is more absurd than taking several and multiple forms – different 
from one another – that have been used by many and trying to put them 
together into a single form? It is as if in building a single temple you were 
to think of taking something from the many examples of different temples 
found all over and made with different images and styles. . . . This would 
be a kind of patching together, or, if you would allow it, a kind of begging. 
This manner was indeed used by men during times of famine, taking what 
was necessary not from one but from many.20
The urgency of men during times of famine: Bramante certainly felt sympa-
thy for these unlucky men – men who most likely are no different from us.
2.3 Abstraction
Bramante’s architecture is abstract.
Abstraction here has nothing to do with the expression “abstract 
art”, as used in reference to the work of artists who privileged geo-
metric or non-representational subjects. Such “abstract art” indeed 
identifies itself with a precise style and is consequently incompat-
ible with the stylistic indifference that is taken here as a constitutive 
feature of abstraction. Here abstraction is understood simply as a 
cognitive process that extracts general consequences from a body of 
empirical data, arriving at conclusions that are then independent from 
the opportunities that promoted their development. In this respect, 
Bramante’s architecture is abstract because, although based on a 
precise confrontation with reality, it aimed at the definition of formal 
relationships between architectural elements that were independent 
from the specific contexts in which they happened to be developed.
Abstraction results in a sort of suspension: content drains away and 
disappears, leaving only formal relationships. This reduction of order 
to a purely formal notation, one with no direct link to the “content” of 
architecture, opens up a possible freedom in space. In fact, if the rela-
tionship between order and void cannot be entirely predicted, if a gap 
remains between the architectural work on order and the experience of 
the void, if the void nullifies any function – in a mathematical sense – that 
might be established to link form and content,21 then emptiness remains 
something suspended, open to a multitude of possible interpretations. 
20.  
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Duvick (Cambridge, MA: 
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21.  
As, for instance, according 
to the function “form follows 
function”.
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And if architecture acknowledges its incapacity to link gestures and void, 
and void and order through a series of linear, one-to-one connections, 
then work on order and work on the void become detached from one 
another: the generality of the conclusions drawn about order does not 
immediately include void. Order is only around the void. Architecture is 
a desire to control the void that has to deal with the impossibility of con-
trolling it – a consciously pathetic, delicate, happily inefficient tyranny.
“Abstraction” means to forget, or to leave out (as in the expression 
“abstracting from”), and in the work of Bramante, an immense num-
ber of issues were left out, forgotten or unresolved.22 In doing this, 
Bramante developed a paradoxical form of architecture, one that was 
both universal, so shareable, and meaningless, so not offering any-
thing to share if not the simple possibility of sharing. Bramante, with 
ruthless indifference to anything else, worked on the production of 
this most abstract universality of order and on the production of this 
specific suspension of the link between order and void – the equiva-
lent of some sort of freedom for human beings crawling into the void.
Bramante took on the responsibility of preserving the multiplicity 
of the void by defending its fundamental ambiguity. His architecture 
was an architecture of non-exclusion, and his fundamental goal was 
protecting possibilities. He looked after the void and defended it as 
the receptacle of the possible. As a result, Bramante’s architecture 
was deliberately unreliable: space was always richer than any possible 
description of it. Space remained unpredictable: it was neither described 
nor announced by the architectural elements. Columns did not explain 
rooms, pavilions did not comment on landscape, doors did not sug-
gest entering. Abstract architecture is an architecture of space alone. Its 
product is a formalized crust of colour around emptiness: “Mass does 
not impose itself any more as exalted solidity: what matters in this 
mass is its limit with respect to the surrounding atmospheric space; 
what matters is the faint linear vibration of the decoration, the subtle 
oscillation or slow expansion of the surface that suggests this limit.”23
2.3.1 The Consequences of Abstraction
Making the architecture of his epoch by means of the architecture 
of the ancient Romans, Bramante produced the space of his time by 
means of a repertoire of another era, and so he introduced a distor-
tion into the relationship of his work to his contemporary world. For 
Bramante, ancient architecture was a tool for suspending the present. 
22.  
See James S. Ackerman, 
“Notes on Bramante’s 
Bad Reputation”, in Studi 
Bramanteschi, 339–49. 
 
23.  
Argan, “II problema del 
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While other Renaissance architects were animated by a desire to reduce 
the distance that separated them from the Romans, Bramante – as a 
Renaissance painter – used the Roman architectural repertoire to 
detach the setting from the gestures happening within it, to increase 
the distance from the contemporary world.24
Bramante increased the space and expanded the time between 
gestures and architecture. He not only combined but also separated all 
of the different pieces he assembled together; he discovered an entire 
landscape in between an arch and its corresponding niche, he diluted 
spatial sequences into a natureless Leonardesque fog that gave vary-
ing depth to the different vapours inhabiting barrel vaults, domes and 
niches. Bramante systematically attempted to increase the distance 
between the different architectural elements, to expand the amount 
of space, to suggest ever more distant landscapes, to maintain a logical 
sharpness while immersing this clarity in distance (Bramante produced 
spaces that are slower than any other spaces of a similar dimension, a 
bit like how Furtwängler played Beethoven more slowly than any other 
conductor). No link was ever direct; elements were always separated 
from one another, related but not immediately. Niches excavated into 
a wall (from the sacristy of San Satiro to the piers of St Peter’s) were 
always framed by an arch separating the order of the main space from 
the cavity of the minor one. These telescopic landscapes in which every 
element is just one step further away than the other expanded space 
into a multiple geography of slowness. If Bramante endorsed anything, 
it was distance, silence, space understood as amplitude, abundance: 
the possibility for others to say what he felt no reason to.
It is precisely this distance that is so promising in Bramante’s archi-
tecture. This distance means that without a change in our historical 
essence, without revolutions or apocalypses, without becoming any-
thing different from what we already are – so, without becoming mod-
ern, or postmodern, or ancient, or primitive or whatever – it is possible 
to establish a relation with the entire complexity with which gestures 
confront architecture. Abstraction is just distance, and distance is per-
fectly possible in contemporary architecture.
Abstraction is the condition for public architecture.
The generosity of architecture coincides with the concave nature of 
space, with void’s capacity to receive, with the absence of a narrative 
that fills emptiness with predetermined feelings. Space can be occu-
pied only if it is empty; it can be public only if it is void. Architecture 
24.  
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can be public only if it has no content, if it simply contains whatever 
its users would like to bring inside it.
By leaving space for the unpredictable to happen, abstraction address-
es the complexity of the human motives that either promoted or occupy 
architecture. By keeping silent, architecture remains loyal to the multi-
tude of motives that inhabit space. Architecture is just meant to protect 
this emptiness: “Wenn alle Krüge zerspringen / Was bleibt von den 
Tränen im Krug”.25 The pitchers say nothing about the tears; they just col-
lect them like inverted domes, providing a form to avoid their dispersal.
A theory that could be of some use for contemporary architecture is, 
in the end, nothing more than a theory of abstraction, a theory that 
could allow the regaining of the abstraction26 that Bramante achieved 
in his work. This would allow the re-location of the core of architectural 
investigation to the interval between gestures, void and order with-
out recourse to preconceived couplings. This would mean imagining 
an architecture without needs (contrary to modernism) and without 
desires (contrary to post-modernisms of any sort). An architecture 
built around gestures that are neither anticipated nor explained nor 
psychoanalyzed: an abstract production of the concave, a careful cal-
culation of a desireless receptacle of others' desires, a humble develop-
ment of a technology for giving precision to the memories of others. 
What would be a good theory for contemporary architecture is a theory 
that precisely explains that in architecture there is nothing to explain.
3. Political Work
Architecture is political work. It is an experiment in the construction of 
agreement between the different subjects involved in the production 
of buildings, and it is an agreement between producers that is then 
offered to everybody as a void open for occupation. 
Bramante understood his work as the construction of the agree-
ment among the producers of architecture: clients, workers, contrac-
tors, state officials. Bramante allowed all of them to leave a trace in his 
architectural objects, which were deliberately charged with a multitude 
of desires, of fears, of nightmares. Bramante’s problem was to show – 
case by case, from the Prevedari engraving to St Peter’s – that different 
desires could coexist, that a more sophisticated order did not need to 
exclude anything, that the series of decisions about order – precisely 
because multiple and arbitrary – could expose an agreement (or at least 
the search for an agreement) that was extended to anybody. 
25.  
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The Prevedari engraving is a declaration of method: forms and signs 
are combined with cunning indifference to produce a multi-layered total-
ity. The variety of figures included in the image – the kneeling monk, the 
soldiers, the dialoguing philosopher-flâneurs, the indifferent passers-by – 
corresponds to the multitude of subjects that are taken into account in 
the configuration of the architectural scene. Santa Maria delle Grazie is 
a similar orchestration of relatively naïve astrological signs moving in 
a sophisticated architectural carousel. Bramante did not try to exercise 
full control over the building and accepted the decorative mania of the 
Lombard craftsmen, provided it could be inscribed within a precise 
equilibrium of spaces. The architecture of the Prevedari engraving, of 
Santa Maria delle Grazie and of St Peter’s is all based on this tolerant 
indifference to differences.27 And although this has driven architectural 
historians nuts, the explanation for the architect’s apparent schizophre-
nia is simple: he just didn’t care. He didn’t care about the decoration of 
Santa Maria delle Grazie, and he didn’t care whether St Peter’s had a cen-
tral or longitudinal plan. He didn’t care about the capitals of St Peter’s, 
and so he simply sent the workers to copy those of the Pantheon. What 
Bramante did care about was the syntax that could allow such plural 
constructions to be held together: the logic of the three apses of Santa 
Maria delle Grazie, the form of the piers of St Peter’s. 
For Bramante, architecture was work – that is, human activity that 
very naïvely aims at the transformation of the world. For Bramante, 
space was built, not found; contrary to Brunelleschi, for Bramante space 
was not deduced from the laws of nature: space was a social product, 
and architecture was political work. Buildings were elementary cases 
for testing the human potential to re-shape the world.
As political work, design combined decisions that responded to a 
multitude of given opportunities; decisions that were made about prob-
lems which were only partially known; decisions that were elaborations 
of incertitude; decisions that were meditations on the arbitrary nature 
of making decisions. Knowing how fragile this architecture of decisions 
was, Bramante produced spatial conditions that systematically exposed 
their instability, their unreality, their lack of foundations. Space incorpo-
rated and exposed its arbitrariness and appeared as a human thing, far 
removed from nature, far removed from necessity, uncertain and fallible 
and fragile and violent. As much as Bramante’s work was the product of 
very precise social circumstances in which men were certainly not all 
equal and not all free, his work imagined all these men as equal and free, 
at least in terms of their relationship to space. The men that requested, 
27.  
Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The 
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(Stanford: Stanford 
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paid for and built the spaces designed by Bramante – the men who nego-
tiated an agreement on form under Bramante’s direction – were free 
men, and precisely for this reason they were also unsure, stupid, often 
vanquished, sometimes evil and, most of all, perplexed.
3.1 Abstract Political Work
The production of space is political, and yet it is political in an entirely 
indirect way: the forms of space do not immediately define the forms of 
the life that unfolds within them.28 On the contrary, space simply defines 
a world that could be adequate for a potential form of life but does not 
impose it. Architecture does not coincide with the gestures happen-
ing within it, and this incongruence allows it to expose other possible 
gestures – another possible life. Somehow architecture multiplies real 
life into a plurality of fragile, uncertain and, most of all, undefined 
possible lives – that measure life like a series of blurred mirror-images. 
And architecture is responsible only for these mirror-images of life, not 
for life itself. This means that the Doric frieze defines the border of the 
room according to the same ideals of equality upon which a constitution 
should be written, and that the measurements of the door are based on 
the same demand of justice that requires the law to be equal for all and 
taxation to be progressive, and yet the precision of the frieze and the 
proportion of the door cannot control what happens inside the room: 
the landlord can enter and evict the poor orphans, and the executioner 
can enter and hang the political refugee.
Architecture as political work is not necessarily in agreement with – 
and has no power over – the immediate political circumstances under 
which it is developed. The political meaning of architecture – what 
could be directly ascribed to the architect – is only an indirect one, 
otherwise all the architecture of the present and the past, made for 
demented emperors, cruel colonels and usurer merchants would be 
all equally detestable, with Bramante’s architecture being the most 
detestable, for it was made for a prince who poisoned his relatives and 
for a pope who liked to personally direct the besieging of enemy for-
tresses.29 Architecture is political work, and yet this work is indirect, 
not immediately identifiable with the policies promoted by the rulers 
who decide to produce architecture.
The fact that architecture is political only in an indirect way also 
means that architects should not abandon such clumsy activity for a more 
directly political battle. There is no need for architects to strip themselves 
of their robes in order to become social activists. In fact, by becoming 
28.  
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social activists, and, so, by becoming indifferent to form and beauty in 
order to pursue an immediate social goal (to entertain orphans, to give 
solace to widows, to make drug addicts stop taking drugs), architecture 
loses its faculty to provide a concrete prefiguration of a political order that 
is not content just to hand out some miserable alms to those very same 
orphans, widows and drug addicts.30 This twofold and often contradic-
tory political dimension of architecture cannot be considered given once 
and for all, and consequently ignored. This question resurfaces in every 
project and needs to be answered case by case – no sweeping formula 
can spare architects the nuisance of having to answer these questions: 
How can one save the ideal generosity of space under the immediate 
circumstances of the architectural object? How can one incorporate 
into architecture an awareness of the current impossibility of creating 
a more refined architecture, and, at the same time, how can one incor-
porate into architecture an awareness (and a promise) of the possibility 
of achieving a more refined architecture (and society)?
Bramante never failed to show his awareness of the cynical gambles 
made in order to produce space in his day. This awareness produced 
the characteristically baffling atmosphere of Bramante’s architecture, 
one that aimed at both convincing and not convincing.
Santa Maria presso San Satiro is perhaps the clearest example: the 
illusive space of the choir is made both to deceive and to reveal, to sug-
gest the expansion of the nave and to exhibit its impossibility, to expand 
the space and to mirror it in the sharpest way. In San Satiro, the viewer 
experiences the unreality of the choir. The fictive space of the choir is 
made to work within the real space of the church: the fake choir is part 
of the real T-plan church, not of an imaginary central-plan church.31 The 
illusion does not substitute reality; rather, the illusion is part of reality.
Bramante’s work is interesting precisely because it pushed this investi-
gation to its limit, coupling the extraordinary generosity of his spaces 
with the most unprejudiced exploitation of the political circumstances 
in which he had to operate. Bramante was not afraid of forging all sorts 
of dreadful alliances in order to proceed with his conquest of beauty. In 
the case of St Peter’s, the scale of the building was so vast that its realiza-
tion required a political project of its own (and this political project was 
not very subtle: it was about selling indulgences throughout Europe). 
The conquest of beauty – as a promise of the possible – required imme-
diate political measures, and these measures directly clashed with this 
30.  
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promise. In St Peter’s, architecture short-circuited politics. The abstract 
political value of space was exposed to a critique of its immediate politi-
cal implications. Indeed, Martin Luther did not particularly like the idea 
of destroying and rebuilding the church.32 Luther’s critique was not just 
a critique of the waste of money and of the immoral fundraising of the 
Renaissance Church; he was more generally questioning the reasons 
behind such a conquest of beauty. What Luther could not understand 
was the need for this useless destruction, for this nonsensical potlatch, 
for this expensive and silly hubris. He did not see any reason to trust 
architecture so much, or to consider space so important. He saw no 
reason to allow architecture any autonomy from common sense.
It is extremely difficult to oppose Luther’s arguments, and it is 
extremely difficult not to see Bramante as responsible – at least partially – 
for a political and religious catastrophe that led to widespread war 
across Europe for more than a century. And yet, as much as it sounds 
disconcerting, a theory of architecture that wants to protect the void 
from the two-faced stupidity of functionalism and symbolism needs 
to take Bramante’s side against Luther, to be brave enough to defend 
the autonomy of architecture from common sense.33 And this requires 
a good reason, not just some complacent praise of nonsense or some 
sort of ridiculous mysticism. And this reason probably has to do with a 
need for form that has an original relation to a possible common life, 
with a sublimation of a constitutive human violence that it is probably 
better not to ignore . . . Anyway, I am not able to provide such a reason; 
all I can do is expose a need. Still this is the biggest question posed 
by the work of Bramante. The demolition of St Peter’s was indeed the 
most ambitious work of art of the Renaissance, the most explicitly cruel 
and sublime. In the end, contemporary mockery of it34 got it right: at 
St Peter’s, Julius II and Bramante were attempting to seize power over 
beauty through a military operation. The plan obviously did not work, 
yet it was a plan – at least, Bramante’s architectural plan – that was 
perfectly consistent with the presuppositions of Western architecture. 
And it is impossible to save Western architecture without saving this 
plan, which is actually its best plan. 
Bramante leaves us with some frightening theoretical homework: 
to find a theory that somehow makes sense of the fragile beauty and 
devastating rage of Western architecture – which, by the way, has been 
the sole architecture left on the planet ever since colonialism eradicated 
all other possible alternatives.
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